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Feminism or Humanism?
Caring for Justice. By Robin West. New York & London: New York
University Press, 1997. Pp. ix, 356. $35.00.
In Jurisprudence and Gender,' her foundational article of a decade ago,
Robin West provocatively claimed that women are inherently "connected"
while men are "separate" and that women and men are thus fundamentally and
essentially different. Nevertheless, West ended her article with a call for a
humanist jurisprudence that would transcend the disagreements between
masculine2 and feminist legal theory.3 In Caring for Justice, West
significantly advances the development of a humanist jurisprudence by
pursuing a synthesis of justice (which she identifies with masculinity) and care
(which she associates with femininity).' Unfortunately, Caring for Justice is
a compendium of West's previous works, some of which seem out of place in
a book titled Caring for Justice and contribute little to either West's specific
goal of synthesizing justice and care or her more general continuing goal of
establishing a humanist jurisprudence. 5 Because of West's failure to consider
the hard cases for her projects, loopholes remain in the synthesis of female and
male moralities and in the foundations for a humanist jurisprudence.
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. C111. L. REv. 1 (1988).
2. See id. at 2 ( "[B]y virtue of their shared embrace of the separation thesis. all of our modem legal
theory-by which I mean 'liberal legalism' and *critical legal theory' collectively-is essentially and
irretrievably masculine.").
3. See id. at 72 ("Feminism must envision a post-patriarchal world."). Although West did not define
"humanist jurisprudence," I believe that she would accept Susan Moller Okin's understanding of "a fully
human moral or political theory" as one that "can be developed only with the full participation of both
sexes." SUSAN MoLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND ThE FAMtLY 107 (1989).
4. It is noteworthy that nowhere in Caring for Justice does West claim to be seeking a humanist
jurisprudence. The book does contribute to this project, however, by seeking to reconcile seeming
contradictions between the sexes.
5. Specifically, chapters three to five are, at best, tangential to these goals. Chapter three is titled "Law.
Literature, and Feminism"; chapter four is "Invisible Victims: Herman Melville's Bartleby the Scrivener
and Susan Glaspell's Jury of Her Peers"; and chapter five is "Feminism. Postmodemism. and Law."
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The theoretical introduction of Caring for Justice presents the purpose of
this otherwise potentially unruly collection. West's fundamental point is that
the historic exclusion of women from the legal system has damaged "our law,
our understanding of the nature of harm and sense of justice" (p. 8) (emphasis
omitted). Because of this exclusion, she argues, the current legal system and
its underlying theoretical justifications are masculine. To incorporate women's
reality into the law, West suggests two fundamental changes to the existing
legal system. First, she urges that the private ethic of care, which arises from
the traditional female role of caring for intimate relationships, be synthesized
with the public ethic of justice in order to sustain both virtues (pp. 22-93).
Second, she contends that the idea of "harm" must be reformed to include
those harms that women disproportionately and distinctively suffer; although
women have achieved formal equality with men in obtaining protection from
harms, she argues, the harms that both sexes are protected from today are
generally most relevant to men (pp. 94-178).
West explains that most people in our culture, scholars and lay people alike,
understand justice and care to be contradictory concepts (p. 23). Justice is
associated with the public realm, universality, reason, and rights; care, on the
other hand, is associated with the private sphere, particularity, relationships, and
affect (p. 23). West argues that this opposition is flawed because care and justice
are actually interdependent: Each is a "necessary condition" of the other (pp. 20,
24-25). In fact, West contends that when justice and care are severed, the results
are tragic. In the judicial realm, "[s]ome of our most horrendous judicial
decisions-decisions easily now recognized as both unjust and uncaring-are
so precisely because they fail to respect, in the social relationships they
envision, protect, or delimit, the interdependency of these two virtues" (p. 25).
Judges employ an ethic of care, West argues, by being sensitive to the
particular litigants and their unique circumstances rather than to the
universalizable aspects of cases (pp. 51-52). West points to Hawkins v.
McGee6 and Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co.7 as two famous cases
in which judges breached the ethic of care by wrongly overgeneralizing (pp.
52-55). Because justice cannot exist without care, she contends, such uncaring
decisiorfs are necessarily unjust: "The judge in each case essentially compared
apples and oranges-treated unlikes as though they were likes-and thus
breached the ethic of justice no less than the ethic of care" (p. 55).
Just as care is required for true justice in the public realm, justice is
necessary for true care in the private realm. Nurturance without consistency,
6. 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929) (using a "warranty-based" rule of damages rather than an "injury-based"
rule to determine recovery for a doctor's botched surgery).
7. 382 P. 109 (Okla. 1962) (choosing a market value rule of damages and ignoring a farmer's personal
ruination to determine the appropriate remedy for breach of promise to restore ruined land).
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West explains, leads to racism, xenophobia, and general fascism (pp. 74-88)."
Polarized nurturance in the law is best exemplified by Plessy v. Ferguson9 and
Dred Scott'0 (p. 75). West explains that the judges in both of these cases
practiced "selective nurturance"-that is, the judges cared about particular
white readers and members of society instead of humans in general, thereby
"facilitating] social relationships which are themselves unjust" (pp. 75-77).
Although "[c]ourts and judges do not themselves enter into relationships of
care.... they are deeply complicit in the construction of those relationships"
(p. 83). The feminine ethic of care, therefore, is necessary to the public realm,
just as the masculine ethic of justice is essential to the private realm.
West further argues that jurisprudence must incorporate women's
experiences. In particular, West opines that contemporary jurisprudence has
failed to investigate the nature of harm as it applies to women, focusing
instead on the cost-efficiency of preventing harm-causing events (pp. 94-95,
166-74). A renewed focus on "what harms us, and how much" (p. 94), West
contends, would reveal that "the rights and remedies universally available to
both women and men are for those harms" that have been historically
"suffered by, recognized by, and taken seriously by, men" (p. 97). Men relate
to harms such as death, theft, assault, and battery (pp. 97-98), but have
difficulty comprehending "gender-specific" harms such as physical invasion,
emotional separation, psychic loss of selfhood, and "patriarchal subjection"
(pp. 100-38). Law not only ignores these distinctively feminine harms, it also
legitimates and compounds them by inadequately compensating "women's
domestic work" (p. 138) and by directly protecting the events that cause the
harm (such as pornography and marital rape) (pp. 138-64). "As a result women
are doubly injured: first by the harm-causing event itself, and second by the
peculiarity or nonexistence of the law's response to those harms" (p. 96).
II
Caring for Justice is significant in its advancement of the debate over the
reconciliation of justice and care. Relational feminists" had previously argued
8. As an example, West shares a memory from the civil rights cra of a white woman holding her
daughter tightly while yelling hateful racial epithets at "small. innocent African American children
attempting the heroic and commonplace act of entering a school building" (p. 75).
9. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
10. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
11. Within the wide spectrum of feminist thought, liberal feminists and "'different voice" feminists are
traditionally considered to be on polar ends from one another. See West. supra note I. at 14 ("lWlhat
unifies radical and cultural feminist theory (and what distinguishes both from liberal feminism) is the
discovery, or rediscovery, of the importance of women's fundamental material difference from men.").
Within "different voice" feminism, there is a basic division between relational, or cultural, feminists (who
focus on the benefits of feminine connectivity) and radical feminists (who emphasize the invasivc.
oppressive, and destructive implications of these connections). See id. at 15. The potential synthesis of
feminist and liberal theory that I discuss is different from what is commonly called liberal feminism
because it draws upon "different voice" feminism to achieve "true" equality rather than just the "formal"
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that care is an ethical activity, not just an emotional-and thus "morally
arbitrary"-reaction (pp. 33-36, 295 n.32). West accepts their claim as a
starting point, but rejects their view 2 that justice and care are "oppositional"
(p. 24). West's argument for the synthesis of justice and care is compelling,
and her applications are powerful. Nevertheless, Caring for Justice remains
incomplete: West does not fully confront the conflicts that must inevitably
arise in the pursuit of her goals, and thus fails to offer direction on how to
resolve the hard cases that emanate from such conflicts.
Richard Rorty presents what may be the most difficult situation for
reconciling justice with care: the war criminal.'3 Rorty explains:
[I]f we had watched the war criminal grow up, had traveled the road
he had traveled, we might have had difficulty reconciling the demands
of love and of justice. But it is well for society that in most cases our
ignorance permits us to avoid this dilemma. Most of the time, justice
has to be enough. 14
West clearly could not agree with Rorty that justice is "enough," but presumably
would want to see the war criminal held fully responsible for his crime. The
closest example West considers is a Maryland case in which, she argues, a
sympathetic judge gave a cuckolded criminal defendant "an extraordinarily light
sentence for killing his wife" (p. 78). According to West, the judge showed a
"nurturant response to the defendant ... at the cost of a dehumanizing
callousness toward the victim" (p. 78). By failing to address the seemingly
contradictory requirements of justice and care in this hard case and by directing
care solely toward the victim, West skirts the question of whether her synthesis
requires some nurturance for even the most unsympathetic defendants.
Consideration of the hard cases thus indicates that West's image of a Venn
diagram to describe the relationship between justice and care (p. 38) 5 might be
inapposite. Since a Venn diagram involves precisely defined conceptual areas,
West should be able to identify some criteria by which to make a principled
determination regarding whether a decision fits into the region of overlap. Yet,
she never does so. Her inability to establish precise boundaries suggests that,
instead of a Venn diagram, justice and care lie on a continuum, oppositional at
equality sought after by liberal feminism. Cf id. at 14 ("[D]uring the same decade that liberal feminist
political activists and lawyers pressed for equal (meaning same) treatment by the law, feminist theorists in
non-legal disciplines rediscovered women's differences from men.").
12. See, e.g., Sherrine M. Walker & Christopher D. Wall, Note & Comment, Feminist Jurisprudence:
Justice and Care, 11 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 255 (1997) (characterizing theories of justice as rights-based, and
presenting an ethic of care as a more pragmatic approach to real world problems).
13. See I RICHARD RORTY, OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND TRUrH: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 205-06
(1991).
14. Id. at 205.
15. West explains that the relationship between justice and care is like that of overlapping circles, and
argues that "only in the area of overlap will one find either true justice or true care" (p. 38).
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the extremes but meeting at some indefinable point in the center. If the
relationship between justice and care is better described as a continuum, then a
spectrum, instead of a Venn diagram, is the appropriate analogy for determining
how cases should be decided.
Additionally, although West ably begins the project of directing our
attention to the point at which justice and care meet, a true reconciliation
would call for collaboration between a number of different legal perspectives.
Caring for Justice alludes to the possibility of an alliance with either economic
or liberal legalists, 16 but concludes that law and economics actually clashes
with feminism because of its commodification of harms (p. 177). Liberal
legalism, on the other hand, would become a natural ally to activist feminism
if it adjusted its understanding of the individual. 17 According to West, the
problem with liberalism is that "the liberal self at best reflects the male
experience of selfhood within the liberal tradition" (p. 282). Modem liberal
legalists envision a "desiring, rational, egotistic self," she argues, which is
"arbitrarily desirous, sated by pleasure, sovereign over one's own subjectivity,
knowledgeable of the objective world through reason and of the subjective
world through introspection and confession" (p. 281).
West's argument for the synthesis of justice and care reveals a competing
understanding of the individual, reflecting an evolution in her own work.'" In
Jurisprudence and Gender, West argued that women's connected nature results
in a feminist tendency toward nurture and care.' 9 West now accepts that a
capacity to care is common to both sexes, though she argues that it is more
closely associated with women (p. 20).20 This is the promise hinted at by
16. "[B]oth economic and liberal legalism ... rest on a changeable conception of the individual (as]
... radically individuated .... [T]hey are asserting a descriptive and empincal-and hence falsifiable-
claim, not a metaphysical or transcendent one" (p. 5).
17. Unfortunately, the term "liberalism" has developed a confused assortment of meanings and
connotations in existing literature. See Mark Tushnet, A Public Philosophy for the Professional-Managerial
Class, 106 YALE L.J. 1571, 1571 n.l (1997) (book review) ("'Liberalism' is of course a contested term.-).
Bruce Ackerman explains that "[p]olitical liberalism is a revolutionary doctrine, based on a radical
idea-that men and wom -i of different beliefs can establish a fair political system that grants all
participants the equal ri. , to live their own lives in their own way." Bruce Ackerman. Political
Liberalisms, 91 J. PHIL. '.4, 377 (1994) (emphasis added) For \Vest's thoughts about liberal theory, see
Robin L. West, Liberalism Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition of the Liberal Vision. 46 U. PiT' L REV.
673 (1985).
18. In her prior work, West wrote: "[T~he claim that what separates us is epistemologically and
morally prior to what connects us[,] while 'trivially true' of men. [is) patently untrue of women .... [Tlhe
'human being' . .. assumed by our modem legal theory contrasts in every particular with the 'woman'...
constructed by modem feminist theory." West, supra note I. at 2-3. In Caring for Justice. West explains
that "a precondition" of the thesis that the ethics of care and justice are interdependent is "that all of us
are capable of employing both these overly polarized moral voices" (p. 20).
19. See West, supra note 1, at 17.
20. This shift in West's thinking should not be understood as an acknowledgment of social
construction of selfhood. West remains committed to a vision of individuals as moral characters, with
biological differences between the sexes (pp. 10-20, 259-92), leaving her at odds with postmodemists and
other anti-essentialists. West also parts ways with Okin on this argument. See OKi., supra note 3, at 6
("The rejection of biological determinism and the corresponding emphasis on gender as a social
construction characterize most current feminist scholarship.").
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Caring for Justice: a new vision of the individual as both "separate" in some
ways and "connected" in others.2'
Unfortunately, West's book ultimately fails to deliver on this promise. An
alternative understanding of the self requires further elaboration than Caring
for Justice provides; this elaboration could be undertaken as a joint endeavor
by liberals and feminists dedicated to the development of a humanist legal
theory. A cohesive understanding of the "connected" and "separate" aspects of
selfhood could result in radical theoretical and legal change. To accomplish
this collaboration, however, liberal and feminist theorists will need to address
hard areas of modern doctrine upon which they conflict, such as First
Amendment law.22 Fortunately, the polarity of debate does not eliminate the
possibility of reconciliation between feminists and liberal legalists. When
liberal theorists recognize the existence of harms, they are willing to support
legal constraints on the production of those harms.23 Thus, feminists and
liberal theorists may indeed be able to reach agreement even in highly
contested areas like the First Amendment.
West has taken the first tentative steps down the path toward a humanist
jurisprudence by explaining the interdependence of justice and care and the
necessity of recognizing uniquely feminine harms. Unfortunately, she leaves
some of the more difficult questions unanswered. To fulfill the promise of
Caring for Justice, West and other theorists must strive for a humanist legal
theory, engaging in active debate and negotiation over how best to resolve
their inevitable conflicts.
-Tatiana Doran
21. Such a new description would require West to overcome fully her prior dichotomy between
"separate" and "connected," and to acknowledge that men and women share both attributes, though one
may be more common to each sex. For example, one might argue that women are biologically more
inclined toward connections, and thus care, because of the potential to experience pregnancy and childbirth.
Cf West, supra note 1, at 21 ("[W]omen are ultimately more "connected"-psychically, emotionally, and
morally--to other human beings because women ... are physically and materially "connected" to those
human beings when the human beings are fetuses and then infants.").
22. Whereas radical feminists such as Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin argue that
pornography silences women and violates their First Amendment rights, see CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON,
ONLY WORDS 1-41 (1993); Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography, and
Equality, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 1, 17-20 (1985), prominent liberal theorists such as Nadine Strossen and
Ronald Dworkin adamantly support the First Amendment rights of pornographers against regulation,
arguing that the harms of such regulation outweigh any benefits to women, see Nadine Strossen, Hate
Speech and Pornography: Do We Have To Choose Between Freedom of Speech and Equality?, 46 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 449 (1996); Ronald Dworkin, Women and Pornography, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 21,
1993, at 36 (reviewing MACKINNON, supra).
23. Liberal legalists have recognized the need to regulate areas that were perceived at one time as
within the realm of freedom, such as working hours, tobacco, and monopolies. See J.M. Balkin, Some
Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DuKE LJ. 375, 383-84.
In fact, Bruce Ackerman explains that liberals differ from libertarians because they "recognize that each
citizen's starting point in life is pervasively shaped by the family, the educational system, the distribution
of wealth, the institution of private property, and the organization of the marketplace." Ackerman, supra
note 17, at 367.
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